Secretary Albright

NATO: Preparing for the Washington Summit

December 8, 1998

Prepared statement for the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium.

Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President d'Honneur, fellow ministers, distinguished colleagues: It is a pleasure to see you all again. We meet at an exciting and historic moment for NATO. Just last Friday, as all allies completed the ratification process, the Protocols on the Accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic entered into force.

As we prepare to undertake NATO's first post-Cold War expansion next spring, prior to the summit, the alliance is considering its vision for the future and initiatives critical to preparing NATO for the 21st century. I look forward to having three new allies join us in this endeavor. Much of our focus this week will be on the future, but our alliance is seized, as well, with present responsibilities.

In Kosovo, NATO's threat to use force has halted large-scale Serb repression. A humanitarian crisis has been averted. A growing international presence is verifying compliance with commitments. And an improved climate has been created for the pursuit of a negotiated political settlement.

I want to pay special tribute to Secretary General Solana for his leadership and express my appreciation to each of you for your solidarity in backing up diplomacy with the credible threat of force. Kosovo is a critical test not only for NATO but for Europe's larger security structure. And we are fortunate to have on our team many valuable players.

Norway is serving as the sponsor nation in Kosovo. France will lead, and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will host, NATO's Extraction Force. The OSCE is organizing the verification mission. Dozens of countries are contributing in one capacity or another to this multinational, multi-institutional effort.

This is appropriate because the stakes are high. We have a security interest in preventing the spread of a conflict that has no natural boundaries. We have a political interest in promoting a peaceful resolution in Kosovo based on fundamental principles of democracy and respect for human rights. We have a humanitarian interest in halting the slaughter and suffering of innocent people. And we have a legal interest in supporting the efforts of the war crimes tribunal to exercise its legitimate jurisdiction over the atrocities committed in Kosovo.

Our alliance has expressed deep concern about acts of provocation committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army—KLA—and we are working with the Kosovar Albanians to press for an end to such acts. But make no mistake: The primary cause of the crisis in Kosovo has been Belgrade's repression, including Milosevic's ruthless use of terror earlier this year. And while the October negotiations led to a fragile cease-fire and opened the way to intrusive international verification, there is still an excessive Serbian police presence in Kosovo.

The aggressive and threatening posture of Serb police and military units has sometimes provoked KLA actions. Serb police should be conducting normal police work, period.

The crisis will not end until Belgrade accepts Kosovo's need for, and right to, substantial autonomy. Ambassador Hill's diplomatic efforts have made substantial progress and have reached an important stage. As a result of his work, there now exists a draft political settlement that can serve as a basis for new political arrangements between the two sides. Our goal is to help the people of Kosovo to get control over their own affairs now, while giving them and Belgrade the opportunity to revisit the final status of the province in the future, when the environment for such fundamental decisions will have improved.

In the coming days, Ambassador Hill will be working closely with both the Kosovo Albanian leadership and the Belgrade authorities to encourage their agreement to this approach. We welcome the support of all our allies and partners in this effort.

In the meantime, we must all work together to build key Kosovo institutions, such as police and electoral structures. These will support the people of Kosovo once they reach a political settlement and buttress the present efforts of the international community there.

Our experience over the past year is that for diplomacy to make progress in Kosovo the credible threat of force is required. If the ongoing political negotiations are to succeed, NATO must maintain its pressure both on Milosevic and the KLA.

At the same time, we must recognize that at the core of the problems in Kosovo is the lack of accountable, democratic leadership in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY. And I hope that every nation represented here will find an appropriate way to support the democratic aspirations of the Serb people. They have been silenced and shackled for far too long.

"Our goal is to expand cooperation among partners on both sides of the Atlantic to advance our mutual security, prosperity, and democracy in Europe and beyond, as we continue to resolve our differences on specific issues."

Over the past year, Montenegro, working within the FRY, has built a more democratic system based on freer markets and a commitment to ethnic tolerance. Serbia would do well to follow that example.

It has now been 3 years since the Dayton peace agreement was signed, ending the brutal and senseless war in Bosnia. Since that time, we have made significant progress in helping the nation to recover and begin to overcome the divisions exacerbated by conflict. First IFOR and now SFOR have played an indispensable role by implementing the military parts of the Dayton agreement and by providing the secure environment in which civilian implementation may proceed. We are focused now on the necessary next steps, recognizing that our goal is not only the absence of hostilities but presence of self-sustaining peace, in which Bosnians are able to take full control of their own future.

To that end, the United States looks forward to the opportunity provided by next week's meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Madrid to set the 1999 agenda for civilian implementation. We believe that the international community should pursue a number of key objectives. For example, we should help and encourage the Bosnians to implement economic reforms required for a market economy.

We should work to develop and reinforce Bosnia's central institutions, including the adoption of a new permanent election law. We should strive to increase the momentum of refugee returns. We should help and encourage the Bosnians to implement needed education and media reforms. And we should work with the Bosnians to institutionalize the rule of law through judicial and police reform.

We must also resolve to get even better results at current levels of civilian and military deployments. We need to ensure that any restructuring of SFOR ensures that NATO's military processes remain linked to other aspects of fulfilling Dayton. We must improve coordination between SFOR and the Office of the High Representative and other civilian agencies, to ensure the best possible implementation of Dayton's civilian tasks. The Multinational Specialized Units should be brought to full strength, and we should consider additional such units to deal with the challenges our ambitious 1999 agenda will create. These steps are critical, for we know that, at this point, civilian implementation cannot succeed without SFOR and that Dayton cannot succeed without civilian implementation.

I would like now to take a few minutes to address the range of issues our alliance confronts as we prepare for the Washington Summit in April. This will be the largest diplomatic gathering at the head-of-state level in that city's history. It will commemorate the vision and wisdom of our predecessors and provide a historic test of our own. For it is there and then that we will set the future course for our alliance.

In Luxembourg, I spoke of President Clinton's desire to work together throughout 1999 to lay the foundation for a broad and comprehensive Euro-Atlantic Partnership for the 21st century. Our goal is to expand cooperation among partners on both sides of the Atlantic to advance our mutual security, prosperity, and democracy in Europe and beyond, as we continue to resolve our differences on specific issues.

I view NATO's future role in that broader partnership as the institution of choice when North America and Europe must act together militarily. My vision of a new and better NATO can be summarized in one sentence: We want an alliance strengthened by new members; capable of collective defense; committed to meeting a wide range of threats to our shared interests and values; and acting in partnership with others to ensure stability, freedom, and peace in and for the entire transatlantic area. This is the goal for our summit and one that I believe is within reach.

As we look to the Washington Summit, we may divide our work into seven essential tasks.

The **first** is to speak in clear and understandable terms to our public and parliaments about NATO's future role and purpose. At the Washington Summit, we should issue a concise, nontechnical political declaration of our vision for a new and better NATO; that vision is of an alliance fully equipped to deal with the security challenges of the future together with the other institutions and relationships that constitute the foundation of our broader Euro-Atlantic partnership.

Our **second** task is to develop, for unveiling at the Washington Summit, an updated Strategic Concept. This is our blueprint for the future. We need to get it right.

The NATO of the 21st century will confront a very different strategic environment than in the past. During the Cold War, we had no trouble identifying an Article V threat to our territory and security. It stared at us from across the Fulda Gap. But the threats we face today and tomorrow could come from a number of different sources, including from areas beyond NATO's immediate borders. I often remind people that a ballistic missile attack using a weapon of mass destruction from a rogue state is every bit as much an Article V threat to our borders now as a Warsaw Pact tank was two decades ago. But we should also recognize that NATO must be better equipped to respond to non-Article V crises as well. For if these threats are not addressed early and effectively, they could grow into Article V threats.

We must be prepared because we know that events beyond NATO's immediate borders can affect vital alliance interests. This is why we acted in Bosnia. This is why we have come together to prevent renewed violence in Kosovo. Common sense tells us that it is sometimes better to deal with instability when it is still at arm's length than to wait until it is at our doorstep.

As President Clinton said in Berlin last May:

> Yesterday's NATO guarded our borders against direct military invasion. Tomorrow's NATO must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against threats to security from beyond them—the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence and regional conflict.

The new Strategic Concept must find the right balance between affirming the centrality of Article V collective defense missions and ensuring that the fundamental tasks of the alliance are intimately related to the broader defense of our common interests. Constructive engagement with partners should also be explicitly recognized as a fundamental task for the alliance.

I know that there are those who try to suggest that by assuming these new missions, or by talking about common Euro-Atlantic interests beyond collective defense, we are somehow tinkering with the original intent of the North Atlantic Treaty. I've said it before; I will repeat it again today: This is hogwash.

The founders of the alliance were wise to allow us the flexibility to come together to meet common threats that could originate from beyond our immediate borders. Some 50 years ago my predecessor, Dean Acheson, pointed out that while the North Atlantic Treaty involves commitments to collective defense, it also allows us to come together to meet common threats that might originate from beyond the North Atlantic area.

We are neither altering the North Atlantic Treaty nor attempting to create some kind of a new "global NATO." What we are doing is using the flexibility the treaty always offered to adapt this alliance to the realities of a new strategic environment and the challenges we must face together in the 21st century. In this context, let me say a word about mandates. NATO will—in all cases—act in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, while continuing to address this issue on a case-by-case basis.

The **third** task we face is to maintain our commitment to NATO enlargement. Our commitment to our Open Door strategy is central to our vision of a new and better NATO for the 21st century. Getting a robust and credible Open Door package is one of the key challenges we face for the Washington Summit.

We must underscore our commitment to the enlargement process by agreeing on a Madrid-plus package that will keep NATO's door open. Both what we say and do as an alliance is critical.

We must agree on a robust Membership Action Plan to help aspiring partners, in practical and focused ways, to accelerate their efforts to become the strongest possible candidates. Without designating them in advance, we need to provide a road map that shows aspirants the way ahead. I welcome the discussions that Secretary General Solana has begun on this issue and hope that we can soon reach consensus on how to proceed.

As an alliance strengthened by new members, our **fourth** task must be to reach agreement on a long-term program to adapt NATO's defense capabilities to carry out the full spectrum of missions in the new Strategic Concept. We need military forces that are designed, equipped, and prepared for 21st-century missions.

We have all recognized the need to develop military forces that are mobile, effective, sustainable, and survivable. For this reason, my good friend Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen has been

working closely with your Defense Ministers to develop a defense capabilities package and a common operational vision for the Washington Summit.

Our **fifth** task is related closely to the previous ones. The summit should address the threat posed to our populations, territory, and to our military forces by weapons of mass destruction, or WMD. We have proposed a comprehensive WMD initiative that builds on the successful work we inaugurated at the 1994 summit. The initiative is designed to ensure that we can effectively address the threat posed by the proliferation of such weapons and their means of delivery. Our plan is to increase information and intelligence-sharing in the alliance, accelerate the development of capabilities to deter and protect against potential WMD use, and underscore our shared commitment to prevent proliferation.

The alliance needs to view the WMD issue not only in a defense context but also as a political challenge that requires a more comprehensive response. We have no desire for NATO to duplicate or supplant other international efforts but rather to complement and reinforce them. We should view NATO not as *the*, but rather *an*, institution of choice among the others addressing this challenge.

Our **sixth** task is working together to develop a European Security and Defense Identity, or ESDI, within the alliance, which the United States has strongly endorsed. We enthusiastically support any such measures that enhance European capabilities. The United States welcomes a more capable European partner, with modern, flexible military forces capable of putting out fires in Europe's own backyard and working with us through the alliance to defend our common interests.

The key to a successful initiative is to focus on practical military capabilities. Any initiative must avoid preempting alliance decisionmaking by delinking ESDI from NATO, avoid duplicating existing efforts, and avoid discriminating against non-EU members. We all agree that we need to finish ESDI based on Berlin decisions by the April summit.

Our seventh and final task is to further intensify and strengthen relations with our European partners. Indeed, in facing future security challenges, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council must also be seen as an instrument of choice. Specifically, the alliance needs to define, in time for the Washington Summit, a framework for joint crisis response operations. We also welcome ideas on developing new mechanisms to improve allied and partner national and multinational forces' ability to act together.

With Russia, we must move ahead in the spirit of the Founding Act. We continue to work side by side with Russia in Bosnia, to consult closely on Kosovo, to discuss summit preparations in the PJC, and to develop common approaches on vital issues such as non-proliferation and the environment.

We need to continue to work with Russia on giving the PJC more substance. We are building the relationship, establishing patterns of cooperation and communication, and strengthening confidence between NATO and Russia. We—and they—are getting better at it. Our exchanges are becoming habit, a familiar practice. But we—and Russia—have to keep it up. We should base our engagement with Russia on mutual interests. We need to create an environment with a maximum degree of certainty, in which Russia can depend on us and we can depend on Russia, with "no surprises."

With Ukraine, we should continue to strengthen our distinctive partnership. Ukraine is a vital contributor to European security. It is in our interests to help it develop its capabilities to cooperate with NATO as a reliable partner and smooth its way fully into the mainstream of our community.

We must also move ahead with completion of CFE adaptation by the time of the OSCE summit next year, a goal we all share. This issue relates directly to the character of NATO's partnerships and capabilities.

An adapted CFE Treaty must have enough flexibility built in to ensure that NATO can respond effectively to future crises without breaching it. It must be constructed so that it does not inhibit the political evolution of Europe or the alliance. And it must not harm the military capabilities of our alliance.

This is a complex negotiation. All 30 states involved have legitimate concerns. If NATO's interests are to be protected, we must be united. If we are to make progress in Vienna in the next months, we need to send a clear message tomorrow about both our commitment and our redlines.

Some decades ago, in the depth of Cold War tensions, Walter Lippman wrote about the realities of his time in words that may serve as a warning to ours.

> With all the danger and worry it causes . . .

[wrote Lippman]

> the Soviet challenge may yet prove . . . a blessing. For . . . if our influence . . . were undisputed, we would, I feel sure, slowly deteriorate. Having . . . lost our daring because everything was. . . so comfortable. We would . . . enter into the decline which has marked. . . so many societies . . . when they have

> come to think there is no great work to be done. For then the night has come and they doze off and they begin to die.

Lippman's fear is being put to the test in this decade. Certainly, there are some in each of our countries who now believe "there is no great work to be done," and that all we have to do to ensure our prosperity, security and freedom is hold on and stay put.

Almost 50 years ago, a generation emerged from war with a fierce dedication to peace. That generation forged an alliance to defend liberty that, throughout the Cold War, would mean as much to those denied their freedom as those already blessed by it.

Today the responsibility is ours to rise above the barrier of complacency of which Walter Lippman wrote, and to build a new framework for freedom. In so doing, we will rely not only on this alliance but on all the great institutions of this continent and of our community. We will keep our door open to new allies and partners, to new ideas and approaches. We will derive inspiration from the enduring principles that brought our predecessors together at this century's midpoint. And we will prepare together with vigor and determination for the challenges of the next.

Thank you very much. And after tomorrow, I will look forward to seeing you all again in Washington.■

Secretary Albright

America's Support for Fundamental Human Rights

December 3, 1998

Address to the Rosalynn Carter Distinguished Lecture Series, Atlanta, Georgia.

Thank you very, very much for that wonderful introduction. I consider myself a very proud product of the Carter administration, and I'm very pleased to have been a part of it with you. Thank you, Director Fivush, for your warm welcome, and thank you all for being here. Mrs. Carter; university officials; members of the faculty, students, and guests: I really am delighted to be here in Atlanta, the Olympic city, to visit your renowned university and Institute of Women's Studies, and I deeply appreciate your willingness to reschedule this event.

As you know, because of the Middle East talks at the Wye Plantation, I couldn't come in October, and at the time I told myself, the bad news is I have to cancel. The good news is that no one understands better how Middle East negotiations can drag on than President and Mrs. Carter. And the really good news is that we actually accomplished something. The peace process, which truly began 20 years ago at Camp David, is finally back on track.

And so I am very happy to be here now, and it's a great privilege to visit with the First Lady from Plains. Whether living in the State House, the White House, or her own house, Rosalynn Carter has forged a remarkable record of public service. She has been and remains a friend to me and a wellspring of strength to millions around the world. And I know that you here at Emory, and we across—all of us—across America, are very, very proud of her. She has been and is a truly remarkable woman. It's a great honor to be with you, Rossalyn.

Another reason I am delighted to be here is that I love academic surroundings, and I especially appreciate the lecture format. In Washington, I'm always reminded to speak in soundbites. Unfortunately, I am a former professor, so my soundbites are usually 50 minutes long.

I promise not to speak quite that long this afternoon, but I do want to explore in some depth a subject that is especially appropriate to a lecture with this name at this institute. And that subject is America's support for fundamental human rights, which include and are inseparable from women's rights. Since I'm in my professor mode, I will begin with a little bit of history.

Fifty years ago this month, representatives from nations around the world came together under the leadership of another great American First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, to sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since its unveiling, that Declaration has been included or referred to in dozens of national constitutions and reaffirmed many times. It is a centerpiece of the argument that we make that respect for human rights is the obligation not just of some, but of every government. Atlantans should be proud that President Jimmy Carter did so much to ensure that the Declaration's principles would be at the core of the foreign policy of the United States.

For reasons both strategic and personal, President Carter placed far greater emphasis on human rights than did his predecessors. And by so doing, he strengthened America's claim to moral leadership, spurred growth in the global human rights movement, and, directly or indirectly, freed many political prisoners and saved many lives. President Carter's determination to advance human rights helped make this a better world.

But it remains very far from perfect. There are many today who point to the gap between the ideals set out in the Universal Declaration and the violations that persist 50 years after that document was signed. These skeptics conclude that we might as well give up; that no matter what we say or do, there will always be repression and discrimination. In this view, the violation of human rights is just another sad reflection on the limits of human nature. To that, I would reply as Katharine Hepburn did to Humphrey Bogart in the movie "African Queen": "Nature, Mr. Allnut, is what we were put into this world to rise above."

The Clinton Administration believes that if we are to build the kind of future we want, we must insist that there is nothing inevitable, and certainly nothing natural, about gross violations of human rights. We must point out that, for the torturer, cruelty is a choice. For the abuser, violence is a choice. For the bigot, intolerance is a choice. And what we have the power to choose, we have the power to change.

Moreover, support for human rights is not just some kind of international social work; it is vital to our security and well-being, for governments that disregard the rights of their own citizens are not likely to respect the rights of anyone else. In this century, virtually every major act of international aggression has been perpetrated by a regime that repressed political rights. Such regimes are also more likely to spark unrest by persecuting minorities, sheltering terrorists, running drugs, or secretly building weapons of mass destruction. And they are enemies not only of political freedom but also of social and economic development.

In any society, people who are free to express their ideas, organize their labor, and invest their capital, will contribute far more than those stunted by repression. This is true of men; it is true also of women. It is obvious in our era that no country can reach its potential if it denies itself the full contributions of half its people. Unfortunately, in too many places today, women remain an undervalued resource.

This is not to say that women have trouble finding work. In many societies, in addition to bearing and nurturing the children, women do most of the non-child-related work. Yet, women are often barred from owning land and permitted little, if any, say in government, while girls are excluded from schools and provided less nourishment than boys.

In our diplomacy, we are working with others to change that, because we know from experience that when women have the power to make their own choices, societies are better able to break the chains of poverty, birth rates stabilize, the spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted disease slows, environmental awareness increases, and socially constructive values are more likely to be passed on to the young. Accordingly, our overseas aid programs are designed to help women succeed through legal reform and access to education, credit, and health care.

And with the leadership and active participation of yet another great First Lady, Hillary Clinton, we have launched the Vital Voices Initiative. This project is bringing women together from around the world to build public-private partnerships and to help women participate fully in the economic and political lives of our nations.

In recent years, we have made great progress, but despite that, in many countries, appalling abuses are still being committed against women. These include coerced abortions and sterilizations, children sold into prostitution, ritual mutilations, dowry murders, and domestic violence. There are those who suggest that all this is cultural, and there's nothing we can do about it. I say it's criminal, and we each have a responsibility to stop it.

That is why the United States expressed outrage about the abuses committed against ethnic Chinese women in Indonesia during the riots last May. It's why America has been the strongest backer of the international war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the Balkans; because we are determined that the authors of ethnic cleansing should be held accountable, and those who consider rape just another tactic of war must answer for their crimes.

It is why we have undertaken a major diplomatic and law enforcement initiative to halt trafficking in women and girls. After all, we believe in zero tolerance for those who sell illegal drugs; we should feel even more strongly about finding, stopping, and jailing those who buy and sell human beings.

Finally, it's why we are speaking up on behalf of the women and girls of Afghanistan, who have been victimized by all factions in their country's bitter civil war. The most powerful of those factions, the Taliban, seems determined to drag Afghan women back from the dawn of the 21st century to roughly the 13th. The only female rights they appear to recognize are the rights to remain silent and invisible, uneducated and unemployed. Afghan women and girls have asked for our help, and we are providing it. We have increased our support for education and training, and we have made it clear that if the leaders of any Afghan faction want international acceptance, they must treat women not as chattel but as people. And they must respect human rights.

One of the most basic human rights for both women and men is spelled out in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration, which provides that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. From the earliest days, Americans have believed in this right, and it is our conviction. And it has been our experience, that nations are stronger, and the lives of their people far richer, when citizens have the freedom to choose, proclaim, and exercise their religious identity.

Under President Clinton, we have integrated the American commitment to religious liberty into our bilateral relationships. We raise the issue directly in discussions with foreign leaders, and we shine a spotlight upon it in regional organizations and at the United Nations. We take other governments' policies toward religious freedom into account when making judgments about whether to provide aid or other benefits. And we have made a special effort to help resolve disputes in areas, such as Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and the Balkans, where religious divisions have combined with other factors to engender violence or endanger peace.

We do all this because religious liberty is fundamental to our own identity; because its denial can cause fear, flight, fighting, or even all-out war; and because intolerance, when not confronted in one area, can grow and spread until it becomes a wilderness of hate.

". . . today, from Asia to Africa to the Andes, U.S. agencies and non-governmental organizations are training judges, drafting commercial codes, aiding civil society, and otherwise helping to assemble the nuts and bolts of freedom."

In all that we do, we stress that our policies are directed neither for nor against any particular religious faith. Over time, in one place or another, persons of virtually every faith have been persecuted. Each time it has diminished us all. So we all have a stake in seeing the precious right of religious liberty is protected for everyone, everywhere, every day.

Another area of emphasis in our human rights policy is freedom of expression. The Universal Declaration provides that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and to impart and receive ideas through the media. The very importance of this right is what causes dictators to want to suppress it, for to a dictator the truth is often inconvenient and sometimes a mortal threat.

And that's why leaders of nations such as North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Cuba, Burma, and Serbia try to grab the truth and leash it like a dog, ration it like bread, or mold it like clay. Their goal is to create their own myths, conceal their own blunders, direct resentments elsewhere, and instill in their people a dread of change.

Atlanta, home to CNN, is the global information capital. That network's broadcasts have done much to reduce the ability of repressive governments to control what their people know and when they know it. The advance of information technology only adds to our faith here in the United States that truth will ultimately prove stronger than any dictator. But that will not happen if those who cherish their own freedoms remain silent when the freedoms of others are denied. Accordingly, we vigorously oppose efforts to suppress independent voices such as Serb President Milosevic's recent, inexcusable crackdown on journalists in his country.

We also sponsor independent broadcasting through the Voice of America and other outlets. We support regional initiatives such as the designation of a Special Rapporteur to monitor threats to reporters in this hemisphere. And around the world, we back the cause of free expression both diplomatically and through material support.

In addition, in a matter related to the flow of information, the Clinton Administration is now conducting a review of documents that may shed light on human rights abuses during the Pinochet era in Chile. As Secretary of State, I am determined that the State Department continue declassifying and making available documents in this area. And I am determined to continue to do so as rapidly as possible under the Administration's guidelines.

Another fundamental right spelled out in the Universal Declaration is the right to take part in government, either directly or through freely chosen representatives. To the United States, this right is basic, and we are encouraged that in recent decades, the right to democratic governance has won increasing acceptance worldwide as the cornerstone for protecting the full range of human rights.

Of course, we know that each country must come to democracy at its own speed and by its own path. But countries that have already established such systems can help: first, by defending their own freedom and that of the entire democratic community, so that no nation that enters the democratic ranks is forced, either by internal or external foes, to leave it; and second, by helping nations in transition to develop durable democratic institutions.

And that's why today, from Asia to Africa to the Andes, U.S. agencies and non-governmental organizations are training judges, drafting commercial codes, aiding civil society, and otherwise helping to assemble the nuts and bolts of freedom.

In the months ahead, we can expect many important tests of democracy. In Indonesia, for example, leaders must heed their people's desire for far-reaching political reform, heal ethnic divisions, deal fairly with the aspirations of those in East Timor and Iryan Java, and prevent further violations of human rights. In Cambodia, the new coalition government must put aside past habits of confrontation and corruption and find a way to work together based on democratic principles. And in our own hemisphere,

Colombia's promising new president is determined to overcome threats posed by drug cartels, guerrillas, paramilitary forces, and poverty, and we are determined to help.

In Africa, there is an opportunity for historic progress in Nigeria, the continent's largest nation. During the past two decades, military governments plundered that country's natural resources, exploited ethnic divisions, and brutally abused human rights. The new interim leadership has promised a sharp break from this sad past, and local elections will be held this week and national elections next year. Independent political parties have been allowed to register, political prisoners have been released, and noted exiles, such as Emory University professor Wole Soyinka, have returned home. The United States strongly supports these developments. Nigerians deserve to live in freedom. But the road ahead will be difficult, and Nigerians have seen promises betrayed all-too often.

Nigeria's course will be determined, as it must be, by its own people. But the international community must do all it can to reinforce the movement toward a political system in which all Nigerians may participate and the rights of all are protected. This is a top priority for the Administration, and I know that it is for the Carter Center as well.

As we look ahead to the new century, we can expect that, perhaps, the greatest test of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law will be in China, where more than one in five of the world's people live. America has a vital interest in non-proliferation, Asian security, and the regional economy that will be affected by the choices China makes. So we are engaged in a dialogue with Chinese leaders to expand cooperation and narrow differences. Since that dialogue began, the issue of human rights has been among the most difficult. And the importance we attach to it has been reflected both in private discussions and in the very public endorsements of democratic values by President Clinton during the recent summits in Washington and Beijing.

We acknowledge that the Chinese people have far greater freedom now than their parents did to make economic choices, move around their country, and choose village committee leaders. Unfortunately, on the core issues of human rights, we still have grave concerns. We have welcomed the release of a number of prisoners of conscience in recent months but are disturbed that others are regularly picked up for essentially the same offense. Nor is it a step forward when some avenues for debate are opened up but individuals such as Xu Wenli and others are harassed, detained, and arrested for trying to exercise the rights of organized political expression.

Overall, the pace of progress toward full respect for human rights is disappointing. Nevertheless, China's indigenous democratic movement continues to test the limits of what is possible, and this in itself is a welcome sign. We may hope that, as time goes by and the connection between political openness and economic prosperity becomes even more apparent, the scope of allowable expression will expand further to the benefit both of China and the world.

Although the specifics of our approach to promoting democracy will vary from country to country, the fundamental goals are the same. We seek to encourage, where we can, the development of free institutions and practices. Some fault these efforts as unrealistic for presuming that democracy is possible in less developed nations. Others suggest we are being "hegemonic" by trying to impose democratic values.

". . . there is no better way for us to show respect for others than to support their right to shape their own futures and select their own leaders. Unlike dictatorship, democracy is never an imposition; it is, by definition, always a choice."

In truth, we understand well that democracy must emerge from the desire of individuals to participate in the decisions that shape their lives. But we see this desire in all countries. And there is no better way for us to show respect for others than to support their right to shape their own futures and select their own leaders. Unlike dictatorship, democracy is never an imposition; it is, by definition, always a choice.

Years ago, not that far from here, a young schoolgirl first became fully aware of the outside world when her teacher told her that a war had broken out in Europe and that it was important for Americans to know about it. At the same time, on the other side of the ocean, a toddler, bundled in her parent's arms, left her home in Czechoslovakia to escape Hitler's army. I am here today only because America understood, as that young schoolgirl, Rosalynn Smith, did in her classroom in Plains, that the freedom and security of the United States depends on the freedom and security of friends abroad.

Half a century ago, American leadership saved Europe from the greatest evil the world has known. Throughout this century, American leadership has made all the difference, not only in my life, but also in the lives of millions of others who have been protected by American soldiers, helped by American assistance, or inspired by American ideals. It is true today, as it was during

the Carter presidency, that America cannot end every conflict, right every wrong, or solve every problem; others must do their part. Ultimately, the people of every country must determine their own destiny.

Still, the United States has the leading role to play, not because of our military power—although that is important—or because of our economic strength—although that matters—but because of what we stand for in the world. And that, at its heart, is the simple but powerful proposition that every individual counts. That is the philosophy of America at its best. That was the driving force behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That is the conviction that inspires this institute to promote women's studies. That is the foundation of the Carter Center's work in support of democracy and freedom against conflict and disease. And that is why Rosalynn Carter has devoted so much of her life to helping the mentally ill, bringing comfort to refugees, and spreading the gospel of education.

It is said that all work that is worth anything is done in faith. This afternoon, let us each vow to keep that faith that every abuse of human rights prevented, every prisoner of conscience released, every barrier to justice brought down, and every country helped to emerge from darkness into the light of freedom will enrich our own lives, inspire others, and explode outward the boundaries of what is achievable on this earth. To this end, I pledge my own best efforts and, respectfully, solicit both your counsel and support.

Thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

The Washington Conference On Holocaust-Era Assets

December 1, 1998

Remarks at the opening of the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets, Washington, DC.

Thank you, Stu [Eizenstat], very much, for that introduction. On behalf of President Clinton and the American people, I'm pleased to join in welcoming all of you to the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets. I want to begin by thanking Miles Lerman and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum for co-hosting this event and for their unceasing efforts to keep before us the memory and lessons of history's most monstrous crime.

I also want to thank one of our nation's most accomplished public servants, Judge Abner Mikva, for accepting the role of conference chairman. And I want to express appreciation to each of you who are participating in our sessions, and especially to those who will chair them, including New York Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Bill McDonough, a good friend; Ambassador Louis Amigues of France; U.S. Representative Ben Gilman and Congressman Jim Leach; and U.S. Ambassador to Sweden, Lyden Olson.

We're here to chart a course for finishing the job of returning or providing compensation for stolen Holocaust assets to survivors and the families of Holocaust victims. This mission began more than five decades ago, even before the war was over, when Nazi looting was condemned by the London Declaration of 1943.

In the early post-war period, the allies made good faith but incomplete efforts at restitution. For decades thereafter, the job lingered unfinished, with vital questions unanswered, important documents unexamined, and critical issues unresolved.

Then, in just the past few years, as Holocaust survivors aged and the century began drawing to a close, the quest for answers received a fresh burst of energy. And for that, the credit must be widely shared. Certainly, the eyes of the world would have remained averted from this issue if not for the remarkable work of the World Jewish Congress and other Jewish and public interest groups. In the face of daunting obstacles, they've been tireless, creative, and very effective.

We are indebted as well to the many governments represented here that have come forward to address this issue with generosity and zeal. I mention particularly Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and the British Government for their insightful publications and statements, and for convening last year's landmark conference in London on Nazi gold. And I am very, very proud of Under Secretary of State Stu Eizenstat and his team for setting out the historical record with rigorous objectivity and exhaustive detail in two U.S. Government reports. Stu, I think we all owe you an incredible debt.

All this is important and hard work. It requires that painful memories be revisited, easy evasions confronted, and inconvenient questions asked and answered. Above all, it demands that we be relentless in our search for truth, despite the fact that in dealing with the Holocaust, the truth is terrible beyond comprehension.

In recent years, the world has done much to retrieve facts from obscurity concerning the secretive handling and pernicious use of Nazi looted gold. No fewer than 17 historical commissions are studying the subject from the perspective of their own countries. The Tripartite Gold Commission has closed out its work, and almost $60 million has been pledged to the relief fund for the victims of Nazi persecution that was launched at the conference in London.

We hope that the progress on gold will serve as a catalyst for similar progress in the categories of assets we will focus on this week, which are insurance and art as well as communal property. In each of these areas, the world's experts are here—from governments and non-governmental organizations, corporate boardrooms, and university classrooms. We're here to compare views and share knowledge, frame the issues, and achieve consensus on ways to move forward as rapidly, thoroughly, and fairly as possible.

The historical and legal challenges vary from issue to issue, but whether we're seeking the payment of life insurance to families of those who perished in the camps, researching artwork from the walls of a museum in Warsaw, or

weighing compensation for a synagogue reduced to ashes in Czechoslovakia, the moral imperative is the same. I hope, therefore, that we will be able to work together constructively in an atmosphere free from threats to develop specific principles and identify best practices for art, insurance, and other topics.

I hope, as well, that our work will be driven by certain overarching imperatives.

The **first** is that our goal must be justice, even though justice in this searing context is a highly relative term. We know well our inability to provide true justice to Holocaust victims. We cannot restore life nor rewrite history. But we can make the ledger slightly less out of balance by devoting our time, energy, and resources to the search for answers, the return of property, and the payment of just claims.

"The struggle to reveal and deal with the full truth surrounding the handling of Holocaust-era assets is wrenching but also cathartic. Only by knowing and being honest about the past can we gain peace in the present and confidence in the future."

Our **second** imperative must be openness. Because the sands of time have obscured so much, we must dig to find the truth. This means that researchers must have access to old archives; by that, I don't mean partial, sporadic, or eventual access—I mean access in full, everywhere, now.

Our **third** imperative is to understand that the obligation to seek truth and act on it is not the burden of some but of all; it is universal. As the United States has recognized by declassifying documents and creating its own presidential advisory commission on Holocaust assets, every nation, every business, every organization, and every person able to contribute to the full telling of the story is obliged to do so. In this arena, none of us is a mere spectator; none is neutral; for better or worse, we are all actors on history's stage.

The **fourth** imperative that propels our work is urgency. Remaining Holocaust survivors have reached an advanced stage in life. More than five decades have passed since the Nazis perpetrated their thefts and murders. As records are lost and memories fade, effective restitution becomes more difficult. So let us each vow that by the dawn of the new century, we have done all things possible to conclude the unfinished business of the old.

Finally, we must remember that our efforts here serve a twin purpose. Part one is to forge a common approach to the issues still surrounding Holocaust assets. Part two is to advance Holocaust education, remembrance, and research. This is a task that knows no end. It must be renewed as the human race is renewed, generation by generation, so that the reality of the Holocaust is always before us and never ceases to disturb us.

It is encouraging that in the months preceding this conference, we have seen significant strides forward. The American Association of Art Museum Directors has formulated principles and guidelines to govern the handling of tabled Holocaust-era art. An international commission led by former Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger has been formed to resolve unpaid insurance claims. Companies participating in that commission have agreed to establish a $90 million humanitarian fund and to audit their books to identify unpaid Holocaust-era claims. And at Sweden's initiative, an unprecedented inter-governmental effort to promote Holocaust education around the world is underway. We hope that every country will participate in that effort.

The struggle to reveal and deal with the full truth surrounding the handling of Holocaust-era assets is wrenching but also cathartic. Only by knowing and being honest about the past can we gain peace in the present and confidence in the future. That is true for nations and for institutions, and it's true as well for people.

I cannot conclude this statement without addressing briefly a subject for which I have not yet found—and will never find—exactly the right words—and that concerns my grandparents, whom I learned recently were Jewish and died along with aunts, uncles, and cousins in the Holocaust.

When I was young, I didn't often think about grandparents; I just knew I didn't have any. I was an infant when I separated from them. Now I, too, have become a grandparent, and I look at my children's children, and the love and pride literally overflows. I am sure now that I was once the object of such affection not only from my parents but from those who gave them life. And as I think of my life now in my 62nd year, I think also of my grandparents' lives in those final years, months, and days.

I think of the faces at the Holocaust Museum and Yad Vashem and the long list of names on the wall of the Pynkas Synagogue in Prague; among them those of my grandparents, Olga and Arnost Korbel and Ruzene Spieglova. I think of the blood that is in my family veins. Does it matter what kind of blood it is? It shouldn't; it is just blood that does its job. But it

mattered to Hitler, and that matters to us all; because that is why 6 million Jews died. And that is why this obscenity of suffering was visited on so many innocent, irreplaceable people—people who loved and enriched life with their warmth, their smiles, and the embrace of their arms; people whose lives ended horribly and far too soon; people whose lives and suffering we must never forget or allow to diminish, even if we must, from time to time, intentionally shock our collective memory.

The people of the world differ in language, culture, history, and choices of worship. Such differences make life interesting and rich. But as the Holocaust cries out to us, we must never allow these distinctions to obscure the common humanity that binds us all as people. We must never allow pride in "us" to curdle into hatred of "them."

Remembering that lesson is what this effort at research and restitution of Holocaust-era assets is really all about. For it is about much more than gold and art and insurance; it's about remembering that no one's blood is less or more precious than our own.

There are those who say that we're all prisoners of history and that humankind is doomed to repeat its worst mistakes over and over again. There are those who view the Holocaust as the freakish consequence of a single demented mind—an accident of history whose repetition we need not fear. Still others point to the passing decades and ask whether it's not time to forget and move on and leave remaining questions unasked and the rest of the truth unknown. And yes, there are still a few who deny the reality that it happened at all.

In reply, we must admit that we're not given perfect wisdom, nor the power to change human character, nor the gift of prophecy. But we do have the power of memory and can make certain that the dead shall never be forgotten from our hearts. We have the power of reason and can separate right from wrong. We have the power of hope and can pray, in the words of the Psalms, for a time when "truth shall spring out of the Earth and righteousness shall look down from Heaven."

And we have the power to choose. We can contemplate the Holocaust and despair, or we can consider the Holocaust and vow never again to allow complacency or fear or despair to excuse inaction.

We gather here this week not to achieve miracles but rather to do everything in our power to replace dark with light, injustice with fairness, contention with consensus, and falsehood with truth. That is the most we *can* do. That is the least we *must* do. It is what we owe to the past. It is our hope for the future, and in the largest sense, it is the hope of the world.

Let me welcome you again to this conference, and may our shared efforts prosper.

Thank you all very, very much. ■

Secretary Albright

APEC: Resuming the Course Toward Prosperity and Growth

November 15, 1998

Intervention at the APEC Ministerial Meeting on the Issues of Iraq and Economic Recovery in Asia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Minister Rafidah, excellencies, and colleagues: Let me begin by thanking our hosts, the Malaysian people, for their hospitality and for the fine arrangements they have made for this conference.

I am proud to join Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, our chief trade negotiator Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, and Deputy Secretary of Commerce Robert Mallett, in representing the United States. And I am pleased to welcome our new partners from Russia, Vietnam, and Peru.

Before I begin, I would like to say just a few words about Iraq. As ministers know, the Government of Iraq has repeatedly refused to comply with UN Security Council resolutions and UN weapons inspections. They want two incompatible elements: to keep weapons of mass destruction and to lift sanctions.

Time and again, Iraq has promised to come into compliance and then broken that promise. Yesterday, it made another such promise in a letter sent to Secretary General Annan, but that letter included a demand that the world agree to Iraq's terms about what a comprehensive review of Iraq's obligations would entail. This is a demand that has already been rejected by the Security Council and is not acceptable.

As a result, President Clinton has chosen to delay his visit to Asia. I have spoken to the President, and he has told me how much he would prefer to be here. He has taken a personal interest in the Asian financial crisis and has pushed all around him to be imaginative and to look for a solution and new ideas. Unfortunately, for months and months, we have been in the Iraq crisis mode. The United States has been patient, while Iraq has been provocative. In consequence, we prepared to act. We remain poised to act. It is up to Saddam Hussein to agree to comply with the will of the international community, without conditions and without delay. Otherwise, he and he alone will be responsible for the consequences.

And now, I return to the subject at hand. Last year, at our meeting in Vancouver, I said that the true test of an institution comes not when skies are sunny and seas calm but rather in times of high winds and storm. The intervening months have certainly been a period of turbulence and testing for the Asia-Pacific community.

We have been confronted by the most severe challenge to the international financial system in five decades. Through much of the region, growth has slowed or turned negative. Tens of millions of people have had their dreams shaken. Many economies are saddled by high unemployment, not enough capital, and too much debt. As a result, our meetings here this weekend are being watched closely. The world wonders whether we will retreat from the principles of economic and political openness around which APEC was built or reaffirm those principles and thereby help restore global financial confidence.

America's position is clear. Over the past quarter-century, expanded trade and freer markets have brought a remarkable flowering of prosperity, especially in this part of the world. Our challenge now is to restore the flow of capital to the region's markets. We can't do that by closing those markets, throwing up protectionist walls, or trying to turn back the clock. Nor can we simply settle for the status quo. Our policies must be pro-growth, pro-prosperity, pro-democracy, and pro-people. This means we must move ahead with the full package on Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization.

We should heed the examples of Thailand and the Republic of Korea, which have responded to the current crisis not by looking for easy answers, but by implementing sound budget and monetary policies, and by improving the governance of their financial sectors.

We should renew our commitment to the rule of law, and by that I mean not the misuse of law to stifle change or repress dissent but democratic laws to curb corruption, ensure accountability, guarantee due process, and

protect human rights. At the same time, we should move ahead on President Clinton's action plan to spur growth, get viable businesses running again, extend trade finance, help people who have been devastated by the crisis, and strengthen the international financial architecture.

I am pleased to say that the United States is doing its share. Our vast markets remain open. To keep our economy growing, the Federal Reserve Board has reduced interest rates twice. Congress has met our obligations to the IMF. We have made $5 billion available to finance trade in the region. We are providing more than $200 million in food aid to Indonesia. We are pushing hard to expand social lending by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank not by a little but substantially and for a period of years.

And we will do more. We will launch a bilateral aid initiative called "Accelerating Economic Recovery in Asia." A U.S. team will travel to the region soon to consult with you about how we can most effectively address urgent needs.

For example, we need to do more to assist children by enhancing child survival, expanding educational opportunity, and helping students to stay in or return to school. We need to do more to help business, especially small- and medium-sized enterprises, to obtain credit and create jobs. We need to develop better systems for helping people cope with inevitable economic dislocations, so they can take advantage of upswings in the global economy while riding out the downturns. And we need to harness the expertise of the private sector to provide hands-on advice on how to attract reliable long-term investment and incorporate best business practices throughout the region. I have in mind a sort of international private sector peace corps. To bring all this together, and to share views and experiences on how to move forward, I propose that APEC establish an ad hoc Task Force on the Social Framework for Growth.

The United States knows that this has been a very painful year for many of our friends in Asia. We recognize that there remain many uncertainties and risks. However, we believe that the region has made a good start in righting itself and resuming its course toward prosperity and growth.

President Clinton first brought APEC leaders together 5 years ago because he believed that the shape of the 21st century would be determined, in large measure, by the policy choices we make and the actions we take. That belief has not weakened, nor has our faith in the skills and ingenuity of the people of this region—nor has America's conviction that, together, we will make the right choices for our economies and for our shared future.

Thank you very much. ■

Deputy Secretary Talbott

U.S. Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report

November 12, 1998

Address at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

Thank you, Mike [Armacost], for that introduction and for the work that Brookings and the Council [on Foreign Relations] have done together to improve national and international understanding of the issue we're here to talk about today: the U.S. interest in peace and security and prosperity on the Asian subcontinent. My colleagues here from the State Department today, Assistant Secretary Rick Inderfurth and Lee Feinstein of our Policy Planning Staff, and I are grateful to Richard Haass, Mort Halperin, Stephen Cohen, and everyone who made the Brookings-CFR [Joint] Task Force so valuable to us in our own diplomatic efforts.

Before I give you a progress report on those efforts, I want to emphasize that our interests in South Asia are long-standing, enduring, and broad-gauge. I'd like to think that even if it had not been for the explosions 6 months ago in the Pokhran desert of Rajasthan and the Chigai Hills of Baluchistan, we would still be meeting here today for a wideranging discussion of a region that is the cradle of several of the world's great religions and civilizations and home to well over 1 billion people, almost one-fifth of all humanity. India and Pakistan deserve more attention than they have traditionally received from the U.S. Government and even from Brookings and the CFR. I'm sure my friends, Ambassadors Chandra and Khokar, would agree.

Certainly, President Clinton has felt that way for a long time. A year-and-a-half ago, he instructed his foreign policy team to explore ways to put our relations with India and Pakistan on a sounder, more mature footing.

The premise, with respect to India, was that relations between our countries were in a rut; we needed to get beyond the correct but rather chilly exchanges of the past. Even the mantra about how the U.S. and India were "the world's oldest and largest democracies," while a factual statement and a source of pride, too often sounded like lipservice. The President looked to India to continue its emergence as a global power. He also saw India and the United States to be natural partners in making our shared expertise in high technology a source of dynamism in the global economy.

As for Pakistan, there, too, the President felt we needed a fresh start. The end of the Cold War had created the opportunity for a new, more sophisticated basis for U.S.-Pakistani relations. He saw Pakistan, as a deeply religious Islamic society and a democracy situated on the crossroads of the Near East and south and central Asia, to be facing choices that will resonate far beyond its own borders.

When the President gave us the task of intensifying and diversifying our engagement with India and Pakistan in early 1997, the question of their nuclear and ballistic-missile programs was, of course, also very much on the agenda. We did not believe our commitment to non-proliferation to be in any way at odds with our interest in better relations with both countries. Quite the contrary: We saw these goals to be mutually reinforcing.

We hope and believe they still are. But the task is more difficult now. The tests in May have increased tensions, highlighted the consequences of misunderstanding and miscalculation, and posed a serious challenge to the viability of the global non-proliferation regime. That means we have no choice but to adjust the focus of our diplomacy accordingly, even while our long-term objectives and interests remain intact.

A starting point for that diplomacy is that India and Pakistan need security, deserve security, and have a right to determine what is necessary to attain security. The essence of the case we are making to them is that there are ways to enhance their security without testing nuclear weapons or deploying missiles and that they will assuredly undermine their security unless they move quickly and boldly to bring under control the action-reaction cycle between them.

In making this case, we are drawing not only from our own experience with nuclear weapons but from what we believe is a misreading of that experience by many Indians and Pakistanis. Since May, we have heard from many Indians and Pakistanis the notion that the tests will usher in an extended period of nuclear stability in South Asia, comparable to the one that preserved the peace between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for a half-century. It's almost as if they see Cold War brinkmanship between the superpowers as something to be emulated.

They should look at the record again, not from the vantage point of having seen the Cold War end peacefully but, rather, from the hard-headed perspective of what it took to manage the rivalry. Mort Halperin and any number of Brookings sages—particularly Hal Sonnenfeldt and John Steinbruner—could provide them with a reading list. I might even have a suggestion or two myself. The U.S. and the Soviet Union had more than one narrow escape. India and Pakistan have even less margin for error than the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. did over Cuba and Berlin, if only for geographical reasons, since no ocean separates them.

Moreover, during the half-century of the Cold War, we and the Soviets never shed a drop of each other's blood on the battlefield—at least, not in a direct conflict. India and Pakistan, by very germane contrast, have over approximately the same span of time fought three wars, and there continue to be frequent and sometimes fatal exchanges of artillery fire across the Line of Control in the disputed territory of Kashmir.

And then there's the economic dimension of security. Before India and Pakistan decide to replicate the U.S. and Soviet nuclear competition, they should consider the price tag. A recent Brookings study estimated that maintaining the American nuclear capability cost the United States just under $5.5 trillion. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, comparable expenses contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet system and state.

The massive spending required to develop nuclear weapons is only a fraction of what is required for safely managing even a modest capability. The tense military situation generated by a nuclearized subcontinent would further drive up overall military budgets—a trend already in evidence.

Perhaps the most serious economic threat to these two developing nations is the near-certainty that foreign capital, which is critical if either is to rehabilitate its infrastructure, will decline as risk-averse investors back away from what will look like an unpredictable environment.

The issue is, of course, complicated by the China factor. Indian officials point to security concerns not just with Pakistan but with their giant neighbor to the north as well. We respect India's right to make that determination. We understand that this is a deeply felt matter steeped in history. We ourselves have an ongoing strategic dialogue with China, including about critical regions, and our determination to foster peace and security in South Asia will continue to be very much a part of our agenda with Beijing.

In discussing these concerns with us, Indian strategists often refer not to any new or burgeoning military threat but to the possibility of competing interests between India and China at some time in the future. The best way to head off any such competition, it seems to us, is for New Delhi and Beijing to resume an intensive bilateral effort to enhance transparency and confidence and to overcome or at least narrow existing differences. In particular, we hope India and China will engage in a candid exchange on their strategic perspectives, goals, and concerns.

"We ourselves have an ongoing strategic dialogue with China, including about critical regions, and our determination to foster peace and security in South Asia will continue to be very much a part of our agenda with Beijing."

India has said that it wants the world to consider its security in a geographical scope that goes beyond the subcontinent itself. So the world should—and so we, the U.S., certainly do. But by precisely that token, we hope the Indians will come to see their security in a context that includes a worldwide trend in support of non-proliferation. Especially since May, India and Pakistan have been bucking that trend, thus putting it in jeopardy.

Now, I can understand how, from an Indian or Pakistani vantage point, the monopoly of the five NPT nuclear-weapons states might look discriminatory. But I would also hope that over time Indians and Pakistanis would not try to redress what they might see as a historical injustice by embracing "the Bomb" just as the rest of the world is trying to wean itself off of the view that "the Bomb" bestows either safety or stature on those who possess it.

We Americans take seriously our own obligations in this regard, and we believe we are meeting them. The U.S. and Russia have already dismantled or deactivated 18,000 nuclear weapons; we are prepared to cut the U.S. and Russian

strategic arsenals by 80% from their Cold War levels. We've also cut our stockpiles of shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons by 90%.

So when we urge the Indians and Pakistanis to call off their own nuclear arms and ballistic-missile race before it's too late, we are practicing what we preach. And when we urge nuclear restraint and warn about the nuclear danger, it is not from a position of smug superiority; rather, it's from a position of having been there and done that. We're trying to share the cautionary lessons of our own experience.

The second half of the 20th century has unfolded under the shadow of the mushroom cloud. The U.S. played its own role in keeping that sometimes frightening drama from becoming a tragedy, and now we're doing everything we can to lift the cloud from the next century.

"We recognize that any progress toward a lasting solution must be based on India's and Pakistan's conceptions of their own national interests."

Let me turn now to the sanctions that the U.S. imposed on both countries in the wake of the tests. They were necessary for several reasons. First, it's the law. Second, sanctions create a disincentive for other states to exercise the nuclear option if they are contemplating it. And third, sanctions are part of our effort to keep faith with the much larger number of nations that have renounced nuclear weapons despite their capacity to develop them. Several of those nations are living proof that having nuclear weapons is not a prerequisite for survival or security.

Our sanctions mean the suspension of military and related technology transfers; they mean stopping most U.S. financial assistance and cutting off foreign assistance programs with the exception of food aid and other humanitarian initiatives, since the purpose of the sanctions is to influence the practices of governments, not to hurt those in need.

The Brookings-CFR Joint Task Force has pointed out that congressionally mandated sanctions are often a blunt instrument, and unilateral sanctions are worse than that, since they can have the perverse effect of isolating the country that imposes them rather than the countries on which they are imposed. I'm convinced that, in this case, we have mitigated both dangers.

First, we have worked assiduously, and I believe, quite successfully with Congress to develop a firm but flexible regime for implementation of the sanctions. We have found there is a high degree of bipartisan support for two propositions: that the U.S. must engage with India and Pakistan as constructively as possible and also that we must strike a balance between our profound differences over the tests and our equally profound desire to see them continue to develop as strong, safe, prosperous democracies. We have already taken advantage of the targeted waiver authority that the law now provides the President so that he can facilitate progress on non-proliferation—more about that in a moment—and also so that he can ensure that there are no unnecessary and unintended consequences for our other interests that are at stake in the region.

Specifically, we have decided to resume support for U.S. business and investment through programs under the auspices of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Exim Bank, and the Trade and Development Agency. The U.S. also decided to waive restrictions on lending by private U.S. banks and to bolster our military-to-military contacts by restoring modest education and training programs. Finally, we have signaled our support for the IMF's efforts to help Pakistan avert a total economic collapse.

As for the concern and the criticism that the U.S. has reacted unilaterally to the challenge posed by the tests, nothing could be further from the truth. From the outset, we have been working in concert with many other countries.

Let me be more specific. The UN Security Council, the Group of Eight major industrialized nations, and the P-5 have each endorsed a set of benchmarks that provide for the Indians and Pakistanis a map of the path away from the nuclear brink and back into the mainstream of the those countries that are part of the solution to the problem of proliferation rather than being part of the problem itself. An unprecedented ad-hoc task force of over a dozen nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, including several that abandoned nuclear-weapons aspirations or status—countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Ukraine—joined in forging a common response. So have regional groupings such as the European Union, the Organization of American States, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and several others.

It is very much in the framework of this international consensus that we have conducted our own bilateral efforts. At the time of the tests in May, President Clinton and Secretary Albright asked me to go to work with the Indians and Pakistanis on three goals that we believe reflect everyone's interests—theirs, ours, and the world's: one, preventing an escalation of nuclear

and missile competition in the region; two, strengthening the global non-proliferation regime; and three, promoting a dialogue between India and Pakistan on the long-term improvement of their relations, including on the subject of Kashmir.

So far, I've held six rounds of discussions with my Indian counterpart, Jaswant Singh, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, and I'll be holding a seventh in Rome next week. On a parallel track, I've held seven rounds with Shamshad Ahmad, the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, including one just last Wednesday here in Washington.

Two principles have guided the American side of this effort: First, we remain committed to the common position of the P-5, G-8, and South Asia Task Force, notably including on the long-range goal of universal adherence to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We do not and will not concede, even by implication, that India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear-weapons states under the NPT. Unless and until they disavow nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities, they will continue to forfeit the full recognition and benefits that accrue to members in good standing of the NPT.

This is a crucial and immutable guideline for our policy, not least because otherwise, we would break faith with the states that foreswore a capability they could have acquired—and we would inadvertently provide an incentive for any country to blast its way into the ranks of the nuclear-weapons states.

Our second principle applies to the near and medium term and to the practice of diplomacy as the art of the possible. We recognize that any progress toward a lasting solution must be based on India's and Pakistan's conceptions of their own national interests. We're under no illusions that either country will alter or constrain its defense programs under duress or simply because we've asked it to. That's why we've developed proposals for near-term steps that are, we believe, fully consistent with the security requirements that my Indian and Pakistani counterparts articulated at the outset of our discussions. The Prime Ministers of both nations have said publicly that they seek to define those requirements at the lowest possible levels.

In other words, while universal NPT adherence remains our long-term goal, we are not simply going to give India and Pakistan the cold shoulder until they take that step. We are working intently with both countries to encourage them to take five practical steps that would help avoid a destabilizing nuclear and missile competition and more generally reduce tensions on the subcontinent and bolster our global non-proliferation goals. Let me say a few words on each step.

First, we have urged India and Pakistan to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT. There has been some progress in that direction. Both countries have declared voluntary moratoriums on further testing, and at the United Nations in September, the two Prime Ministers pointed their governments toward CTBT adherence within a year. We hope that India and Pakistan will take that step as soon as possible, and we applaud the work that the Prime Ministers have done in their respective countries to build public support for an agreement that has long been demonized but that now, in the wake of the tests in May, represents an opportunity to stabilize the region.

The second step we are urging India and Pakistan to take in the near future is to halt all production of fissile material, which constitutes the essential building block of nuclear weapons. On this point, too, there have been some encouraging developments. The agreement earlier this year of India and Pakistan to join talks at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a fissile material cut-off treaty allowed those long-stalled discussions to go forward. This agreement could be an important milestone in promoting international acceptance of a key principle of nuclear arms control.

But even if, as we hope, those negotiations go well and move forward quickly, completion and formal entry into force of a cut-off treaty is still several years away. To prevent accumulation of fissile material during that time, we urge India and Pakistan to join the other nations that have conducted nuclear test explosions in announcing that they will refrain from producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, pending conclusion of a treaty.

The third key objective of our discussions with the Indians and the Pakistanis involves limitations on the development and deployment of missiles and aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. The point here is that the testing of explosive devices is not the only threat to peace. Unless both India and Pakistan exercise genuine restraint and great care, the delivery systems themselves could become a source of tension and could by their nature and disposition increase the incentive to attack first in a crisis. They could also increase the risk that weapons would be used as a result of accident or miscalculation. That's why, in keeping with their stated desire to define their security requirements at the lowest possible levels, we have urged our Indian and Pakistani counterparts to consider strategic restraint measures—a package of prudent constraints on

the development, flight testing, and storage of missiles, and also on the basing of nuclear-capable aircraft.

The principles of prudence and restraint also apply to the fourth issue we have raised with our Indian and Pakistani counterparts: tightened export controls on sensitive materials and technologies that could be used in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Both countries have good track records on which to build in this regard, and both have agreed that it makes sense to bring their existing policies and regimes up to international standards. Hence, our discussions have moved beyond the realm of principle into that of the practical, including the exchange of information and expertise.

While the first four benchmarks deal with the overt manifestations of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition, the fifth deals with the underlying causes: the long-standing tensions and disputes between the two. My Indian colleague Jaswant Singh often says that India and Pakistan are "born of the same womb." Yet they have been prisoners of their animosity and distrust. No amount of diplomatic exertion on our part, on non-proliferation or any other subject, will have much effect unless and until India and Pakistan can liberate themselves from their own enmity. And while we and others can help through our good offices with both, that liberation will occur only through direct, high-level, frequent, and, above all, productive dialogue between the two of them.

In this crucial respect, we have seen some favorable developments, especially the resumption of talks between the two foreign secretaries in Islamabad last month. They are talking about Kashmir, they are talking about confidence-building measures, about better communications between civilian and military experts, about bus lines across the border, about trading in energy.

Moreover, India and Pakistan are far more likely to move toward stabilizing their military competition and—we would hope—ultimately meeting the non-proliferation benchmarks that we and the international community are urging them to take—if each knows, through bilateral dialogue, what the other is doing and planning.

In that spirit, we hope that direct contacts between India and Pakistan will not only complement but eventually supersede the efforts of the United States. We hope that for two reasons. First, it would be as it should be: two great countries dealing directly, normally, and peacefully with each other to their mutual benefit and in pursuit of their many mutual interests. Second, a breakthrough between India and Pakistan would allow us, the United States, to get on with the task that President Clinton set for us before the tests: developing the kind of broad-gauge, forward-looking bilateral relationships with these two countries, each in its own right, that they and we want and deserve.

Meanwhile—and I suspect it will be a fairly long meanwhile—we will continue to work the challenges and the dilemmas at hand. We will also continue to be open to thinking outside the box, and that comes from outside the government. With that in mind, let me conclude this progress report with a reiteration of my thanks for what Brookings and the CFR have already done in this regard—and with an invitation for more help in the form of your comments and questions now. ■

Frank E. Loy

Women, Population, and Science At the New Millennium

December 1, 1998

Address by the Under Secretary for Global Affairs to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, DC.

First, I want to bring you greetings from Secretary Albright, who asked me to say how sorry she was that her schedule did not permit her to join us today. I am sure that she thought sending a man in her place to discuss this topic would be a tremendous consciousness-raising exercise—for the man, anyway.

I come to my present job after many years of active work in the NGO community, including NGOs that are active in the population field. The issues that bring us all together here today—women, population, and science—are, I assure you, close to my heart and my job. And I intend to pursue them with the same kind of energy and dedication that you bring to the table. That's a pledge.

I can't come here to AAAS without mentioning the State Department's responsibility for the management of international scientific issues and the interest AAAS President Greenwood and the rest of the organization have in ensuring that the Department manages that responsibility as effectively as possible. Although I have only recently been confirmed, it is apparent to me that the management of international science and technology is an area that deserves significant attention. In the next few months, I intend to consult with the scientific community on the role of the Department regarding international science. I hope that early next year, AAAS will give me another opportunity to talk with the organization on this issue, because I'll be dealing with it very lightly today.

Secretary Albright has often said that, as a girl, she never even dreamed of becoming Secretary of State. The idea was not within the realm of the possible. Of course, I also failed to imagine that I would grow up to work for a female Secretary of State. But then, I missed a few other things as well: the tripling of the world's population in my lifetime—so far; the appearance of a baseball player who could hit 70 home runs in a season; the development of science that could perform laser surgery and send email around the world—all, I might add, without curing the common cold or producing an easy-to-operate VCR.

Our ability to predict the future is flawed, but we have proven from time to time, most particularly at the conference we honor today—the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo—that as we grapple with some of the tough problems we face, we can learn from the past, from experience, and from empirical research. And we brought that to bear at Cairo.

As we begin to assess where we are, we need to look at what Cairo really said to us all. We knew before Cairo that rapid population growth strains resources, slows development, and helps perpetuate poverty. At Cairo, we converted this knowledge held by scientists: the fact that smaller families and slower population growth depend not on "population control" but on free and informed choice, to a belief shared by policymakers. We agreed at Cairo that promoting women's education was a very effective means—along with providing family planning services—to lower family size and improve family health.

Specifically, in the Cairo Program of Action, 180 nations agreed that our focus must be not on targets and quotas but on the needs and desires of individuals and families. We agreed on the singular importance of empowering women—both as a worthy goal in itself and because we had seen in nation after nation, study after study, that when women gain control over their lives and their bodies, health improves, maternal and child mortality declines, rates of sexually transmitted disease decrease, population growth rates stabilize, and societies prosper. And let me just note that what we learned then, and what the past 5 years has proven, is that population and development challenges will not be solved until

women are afforded equal opportunity and access to education, jobs, health care, legal rights, and political participation.

To get the job done, we put together a plan at Cairo to achieve three goals over 20 years: first, making a full range of family planning and other basic health services universally available; second, cutting infant, child, and maternal mortality; and third, ensuring universal access to education, especially for girls. We also made a collective commitment to pay for it, counting on international and private organizations, as well as developed and developing nations. Cairo, in short, gave us the blueprint for achieving sustainable development.

So the question before us today, and throughout the ICPD+5 review, is: How are we doing? There is little doubt that the inspiration shared at Cairo has produced remarkable results around the world. Community organizers from Brazil to Bangladesh are using the Program of Action to plan for the future—and to insist that governments fulfill their pledges.

Girls' school enrollment is up over 70% in Malawi, has increased more than tenfold in parts of Egypt, and continues to rise significantly throughout the developing world. India has dropped its demographic targets and is focusing instead on improving community health and the quality of family planning services. In parts of the former Soviet Union, where access to family planning services has increased, abortion rates have declined by as much as 40%.

In the U.S., implementation of Cairo has also seen some wonderful success stories. With the leadership of the First Lady, Secretary Albright, and USAID Administrator Brian Atwood, we have become major promoters of better health, education, opportunity, and equity for women and girls around the world.

Led by USAID, the United States has helped put Cairo into action in over 50 countries, revamping and improving our programs to focus on all the aspects of the Cairo consensus. We are working to address the special needs of adolescents, to promote men's involvement in childrearing and health issues, and to advance women's political participation. USAID's Democracy and Governance Initiative in Nigeria, for example, has helped mobilize about 127,000 women to vote in just the past 2 years.

But before we get carried away by the new approaches I have discussed, let me say something about a central part of the picture—family planning assistance. With financial contributions of $385 million a year, and immeasurable contributions of technical assistance, we in the U.S. remain the largest, single bilateral donor of family planning assistance in the world. We know that family planning reduces maternal mortality; improves children's health; expands life options for women, so they can be more productive members of their societies; and reduces the burden on schools, public services, and the environment. Simply put, family planning saves lives.

For 30 years, USAID has been the leader in designing and delivering high quality, voluntary, and client-oriented family planning services in the developing world. Today, with family planning services more widely available than ever—and budgets tighter than ever—USAID continues to work to improve quality of care, expand the choice of contraceptive methods, and train medical professionals and community leaders to provide these services.

Concurrently, here at home in the U.S., we have heightened attention to women's health issues in government and the academic and scientific communities. And Congress this year required that insurance companies cover the cost of a range of contraceptives under the health benefits for every federal employee.

So my short answer to "How have we done?" is this: We have accomplished a great deal that might never have been done without Cairo. And we ought to celebrate that and take pride in it. At the same time, there is no denying that we still have far to go to meet the commitments we made at Cairo.

Here in the U.S., the rate of teen pregnancies remains among the highest in the industrialized world. Forty thousand new HIV infections occur each year, disproportionately affecting minority groups.

Almost 150 million women in developing countries still want, but don't have access to, family planning services. There are at least 100 million unintended pregnancies in the world each year, the majority of which end in abortion. Over 33 million people around the world live with HIV/AIDS. And every day, 1,600 women die in pregnancy or childbirth—over half a million each year.

Everyone in this room knows that we are not keeping up with the problems, with the pace that the Program of Action's 20-year framework requires, with the challenges stemming from the fact that one-sixth of the Earth's population, more than 1 billion people, are between the ages of 15 and 24, ready to enter the job market and to start families. And the generation behind them is even larger—the largest in history.

We can't be complacent. The challenge of Cairo is by no means met. We need to do much better.

With a group like this, it is not useful to simply lament the situation, so let me be a bit more concrete and focus on three specific areas where I think we must do better. First, the

devastation being wrought by HIV / AIDS and the need to better integrate our fight against AIDS into our population policies and programs. Second, the need to harness the products of cutting-edge science in our efforts. And last but by no means least, the question with which the United States is already struggling—how to pay for all of this.

The scourge of HIV / AIDS makes our job—promoting human development—much, much harder—and for very understandable reasons. It is hard to think of increasing resources for child health when children are becoming infected at birth and when parents dying of AIDS won't be around to care for them. It is hard to plan for productive lives when life expectancy drops to 47 years in Botswana and 44 in Zimbabwe. And it is hard to promote family planning when families are straining to bury their dead.

Especially today, on World AIDS Day, we remember that the AIDS pandemic is a health disaster that is choking the life out of entire societies. Governments, NGOs, and international organizations must do better at overcoming bureaucratic obstacles and fundraising difficulties to see that family planning and AIDS prevention are both high priorities. Integration of family planning and AIDS education programs must become a powerful and cost-effective part of comprehensive strategies for reproductive health.

As policymakers and advocates, we need to walk the fine line between understanding what science—and the progress and products it brings forth—can do for us and expecting science to solve all our problems that we can't handle by other means. And that is true whether the topic is contraceptive research, AIDS vaccines, or technology to deal with the consequences of population growth.

We need to get better at making use of the things that science produces for us. When we fail to do so, we risk misfires like the introduction of Norplant, particularly in the United States. In that case, hard science had provided a new contraceptive with tremendous potential, but the marketing and supervision of the product was often inadequate. Poorly trained and insensitive health practitioners often made some women regret having tried Norplant. As a result, donors are now more reluctant to provide it, and much work needs to be done to restore the trust of thousands of women.

Finally, no matter how much inspired research is being done, and how well programs are designed and implemented, without funding, our programs will not reach people in need. At Cairo, developing countries agreed to contribute $11.3 billion to population programs by the year 2000. They're two-thirds of the way there. The donor community pledged to contribute $5.7 billion. We're only a third of the way there. It is sad, but true, that the country which risks being the biggest Cairo deadbeat of all is the United States.

In 1995, the first year after Cairo, we were well on track. But our bilateral funding for international family planning programs, which reached $540 million that year, was regrettably cut by Congress—by 35%. And it has stagnated since, as has our funding for other Cairo priorities. We would need to triple our contributions over the next year in order to reach our ICPD goal for the year 2000.

Fortunately, American non-governmental organizations and foundations have made a heroic effort to step into the gap left when our funding has been slashed or eliminated. I want to thank you for what you've done and ask you to hang in there. But I also want to tell you that we are not giving up.

The Clinton Administration is firmly committed to Cairo's objectives; to maintaining American leadership in reproductive health, including family planning, to girls' education, and women's empowerment; and to supporting UNFPA and other international efforts. I view this as a personal challenge.

Our loss of funding for UNFPA is a particularly painful topic. But I want to assure you that we are actively exploring possibilities to resume our funding for UNFPA as soon as possible. Those efforts will be one of my top priorities.

"At Cairo, developing countries agreed to contribute $11.3 billion to population programs by the year 2000. They're two-thirds of the way there. The donor community pledged to contribute $5.7 billion. We're only a third of the way there. It is sad, but true, that the country which risks being the biggest Cairo deadbeat of all is the United States."

Why is funding for UNFPA so important? UNFPA works to provide voluntary family planning services, maternal and child health care, and sexually transmitted disease prevention in more than 160 countries, including many that American programs don't or can't reach.

Cuts to UNFPA have terrible, immediate human consequences. UNFPA estimates that, in one year, our contribution would have prevented the deaths of 1,200 mothers and 22,500 babies. Our funding would have provided contraceptives to prevent half a million unwanted pregnancies. In the absence of better family planning, UNFPA believes, 200,000 of those pregnancies will end in abortion.

Now, I don't believe that is what Congress intended. Nor do I believe Congress—or the American people—want to see the health of mothers and children suffer.

Clearly, we have more work to do in building support for reproductive health programs, including family planning, in this country. Many of us in the field may be guilty of taking Cairo's consensus for granted—and not taking enough care to get the word out about exactly how we are going about stabilizing population growth.

We know that the best programs are not about distributing thousands of doses of some contraceptive method or meeting numerical targets for population growth rates. We know that the best, most sustainable programs help women and men stay healthy, have strong families, and make their own informed choices about childbearing—basic freedoms Americans take for granted. And we know that family planning is a part, but only a part, of that effort.

What the congressional debate demonstrated to me was that we have not done enough to discredit the belief that population programs the world over consist of forced abortions, forced sterilizations, and heaven knows what else. We know that there are occasionally problems and abuses. We ought always to react firmly to allegations of coercion or abuse—and we will.

We must also remember that those abuses cast a long shadow—perhaps none longer than the coercive, invasive reproductive health practices documented over the years in China.

But for several years now, Chinese demographers and academics have reached conclusions familiar to any veteran of Cairo. Mandatory, punitive programs and targets don't work they say. What works is raising incomes, providing choices, and offering women the opportunity to shape their own destinies and make their own health decisions.

UNFPA has begun a promising program in 32 Chinese counties to demonstrate just how productive the voluntary approach can be. In those counties, China has agreed to make its programs, clinics, activities, and records available to international scrutiny, comment, and change. And China has agreed to abide by UNFPA's—and the international community's—standards for noncoercive family planning.

This program was designed very carefully and deliberately, with input from a number of countries and experts. Nonetheless, we've asked our embassy in Beijing and our consulates throughout China, to be very active in monitoring the UNFPA program and to report on how they're doing.

We don't expect to see radical changes everywhere overnight, but our staff has already seen some changes for the better: Rural women are receiving reproductive health care for the first time—and from someone they could trust. And doctors are better equipped to act in the best interests of their patients.

Cairo and UNFPA have played major roles in promoting and furthering these changes. The United States should be encouraging these advances, not hampering UNFPA in its efforts to help millions of people worldwide.

Despite the funding difficulties we face, I do not want for a minute to lose sight of the outstanding progress that has been made in so many areas. I am very proud to be part of an Administration that has constantly challenged attempts by Congress since 1994 to chisel away our reproductive health programs. I am proud to work with people like Madeleine Albright and Brian Atwood, who have put women, population, and sustainable development at the very heart of American foreign policy. And I am proud to work with a team that has shown such unprecedented openness to the NGO community.

For little of what we've achieved, from before Cairo through today, would have been possible without NGOs leading the way. NGOs have formed grassroots networks here and around the world, to help people get the health care and family planning they want. They have lobbied to let governments know what is needed and to make sure they come through. They have done much of the cutting-edge research, led outstanding assistance programs, and held the international community's feet to the fire again and again to hold up our end of the Cairo promise.

I am firmly committed to working with you and to building on the ties I inherited from my predecessor, Tim Wirth. And I want to begin a dialogue that goes beyond day-to-day issues to the more strategic questions as well: What are the respective roles of NGOs and government in an age of shrinking public resources and technological advances? How can we avoid working at cross-purposes? How can we tap into the resources and expertise that the private sector, here and around the world, has to offer?

Those are just some of the questions we will be asking as we evaluate our progress since Cairo and as we look at the road ahead. Today, your discussions will begin to formulate some answers, and I look forward to hearing them. I am proud to work with the NGO community and proud of our record to family health. I look forward to making Cairo+5 a good review of what we've done, but most of all, I look forward to working with you in the weeks, months, and years ahead. ■

TREATY ACTIONS

MULTILATERAL

War, Prevention of
Convention for the Pacific settlement of international disputes. Signed at The Hague July 29, 1899. Entered into force Sept. 4, 1900.
Accession: Croatia, Oct. 2, 1998; effective Oct. 8, 1991.

Convention for the Pacific settlement of international disputes. Signed at The Hague Oct. 18, 1907. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1910.
Accession: South Africa, Oct. 22, 1998.

BILATERAL

Colombia
Agreement for cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at Washington Oct. 28, 1998. Entered into force Oct. 28, 1998.

Czech Republic
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Prague June 11, 1998. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1998.

Egypt
Agreement amending the grant agreement of Sept. 28, 1995, as amended, for the Agricultural Policy Reform Program. Signed at Cairo Sept. 29, 1998. Entered into force Sept. 29, 1998.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of Sept. 29, 1994, as amended, for Power Sector Support II. Signed at Cairo Sept. 30, 1998. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1998.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of Sept. 29, 1993, as amended, for Telecommunications Sector Support. Signed at Cairo Sept. 30, 1998. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1998.

Japan
Agreement amending the memorandum of understanding of Sept. 29, 1992 for a Ducted Rocket Engine Cooperative Research and Development Program. Signed at Tokyo and Washington Sept. 23 and 29, 1998. Entered into force Sept. 29, 1998.

Jordan
Agreement amending the grant agreement of June 26, 1997, as amended, for the increased economic opportunities for Jordanians strategic objective, with annex. Signed at Amman Aug. 10, 1998. Entered into force Aug. 10, 1998.

Korea
Memorandum of understanding concerning the sanitary control of fresh frozen mulluscan shellfish destined for exportation from Korea to the United States, with annex. Signed at Rockville and Washington Oct. 28, 1998. Entered into force Oct. 28, 1998.

Macedonia
Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with attachment. Effected by exchange of notes at Skopje July 27 and Sept. 23, 1998. Entered into force Sept. 23, 1998.

Nicaragua
Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Managua Oct. 20, 1998. Entered into force following signature and receipt by Nicaragua of written notice from U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex. Signed at Washington Oct. 21, 1998. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1998.

Russia
Agreement on the Nuclear Cities Initiative, with annex. Signed at Vienna Sept. 22, 1998. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1998.

Sri Lanka
Agreement concerning a full and final settlement of the investment dispute between Enterprise Development International, Inc., formerly Enterprise Development Inc., and the Sri Lanka State Timber Corporation relating to Charlanka Company Ltd. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 30, 1998. Entered into force Oct. 30, 1998.

Thailand
Agreement concerning an International Law Enforcement Academy. Signed at Bangkok Sept. 30, 1998. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1998.

Ukraine
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical cooperation in the earth sciences. Signed at Reston and Kiev Aug. 13 and Sept. 17, 1998. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1998. ■